strategies to protect groundwater that we will examine in this paper are generally profitable In response to increasing public concern over the contribution of agricultural pollutants to the degradation of surface and ground water supplies, the 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act (FACTA) authorized the USDA to initiate the Water Quality Incentive Program (WQIP). WQIP is administered by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) through the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP). Its goal is to mitigate the negative impacts of agricultural activities on ground and surface water supplies through the use of stewardship payments and technical assistance to farmers who agree to implement approved practices. With these incentives, farmers are encouraged to experiment with more environmentally benign production practices than they otherwise would use. In 1992 and 1993, the funding levels for WQIP were $6.75 million and $15 million, respectively. Currently, farmers in only a small number of watersheds are eligible to enter the program. However, the issue has been raised (e.g., Sinner) of making this type of incentive payment program more widely available.
WQIP incentive payments are not determined through market interaction.
Instead, the payments are essentially a fixed offer amount. As a result, a function modeling the probability of adoption of a practice as a function of the incentive payment cannot be estimated from current market data. Using the results of a survey of farmers, our goal is to model the probability of adopting a preferred farming practice as a function of the incentive payments. This response function would be useful in comparing the benefits and costs of encouraging farmers to try the various preferred management practices. In conjunction with this goal, our secondary goal is to model how many acres the farmer will devote to the new practice, given the decision to adopt.
The USDA believes that the five agri-chemical management and production profitability, not all farmers who could adopt these practices have done so. One re may be that the farmer is risk averse: even if the alternative practice might appear profitable on paper, the farmer may be unwilling to adopt the practice unless the fa sees neighboring farmers adopting it. Another reason for not adopting the practice migh be that the farmer either has no information, or lacks sufficient information, on the alternative practice. Hence, an empirical comparison of profits or costs under the o the new practices will not provide enough information to determine the necessary incentive payment to encourage adoption. To avoid these problems associated with estimating minimum willingness to accept (WTA) to change practices as the difference in cost or profit between the two states, one can use a direct revelation technique for assessing the probability of farmer adoption at various incentive payment levels.
E
While the researcher could directly elicit from the current nonadopting minimum WTA necessary to adopt the practice, a dichotomous choice (DC) approach is likely to be preferable. Under this approach, the respondent is prompted to provide a "Yes" or "No" response to a dollar bid amount contained in the valuation question, whe the bid amount is varied across the respondents. This method is particularly likely to reveal accurate statements of value as the format provides reasonable incentives for val formulation and reliable value statement (Hoehn and Randall) . instead of trying to identify the farmer's profit function (which would not include any profit-independent reasons to accept the program), we simply need to determine whethe not the farmer's minimum WTA is less than or equal to the offered payment incentive.
The farmer's decision process is modeled using the random utility model approach.
From the utility theoretic standpoint, a farmer is willing to accept $C to switch to a new production practice if the farmer's utility with the new practice and incentive payment is at least as great as at the initial state; i.e., if U(0,y;x) ≤ U(1,y + C;x), where 0 is the base state 1 is the state with the WQIP practice, y is farmer i's income, and x is a vector of other attributes of the farmer that may affect the WTA decision. C can be written as C * + δ, where δ is state 0 pecuniary costs less state 1 pecuniary costs, and where C * is the government's incentive payment. Hence, C can be considered a 'net' incentive paymen
Note that δ can be positive; due to some nonpecuniary costs, a farmer may not have switched to the preferred practice even if δ is positive. The farmer's utility function U(i,y;s) is unknown because some components are unobservable to the researcher, an thus, can be considered a random variable from the researcher's standpoint. The observable portion is V(i,y;x), the mean of the random variable U. With the addition of a error ε i , where ε i is an independently and identically distributed random variable w mean, the farmer's decision to accept $C can be re-expressed as
If V(i,y;x) = γ i + αy, where α > 0, for i = 0,1, then the farmer is wi
The decision to accept $C can be expressed in a probability framework as Pr{WTA (2) is the adoption equation discussed in the previous section, y 1i = 1 if
above, it is compatible with the theory of utility maximization. The probabilities of participation in the program for a schedule of incentive payments simply can be obtained
2 Because rates of adoption at a particular incentive payment value may vary among the practices, the optimal rate of adoption may not be the same across practices from a cost effectiveness standpoint.
Estimation of Minimum WTA and Level of WQIP Enrollment.
Traditionally, univariate probit or logit is used t d respondents as only those respondents who do not currently use the p were asked the DC questions. Regressing the DC data without accounting for the nonrandom selection of this data from the survey data set can produce biased and inefficient coefficient estimates (Boyes, Hoffman, and Low) . For the survey, a sample selection question was used to identify respondents who do not currently (in 1992) u practice. Next, respondents who said that they did not currently use the practice w asked the WTA question. Formally, denoting the 0/1 response to the sample selection question as y 2i and denoting the 0/1 response to the adoption question as y 1i , y 1i is observed only when y 2i = 0. In other words, the disturbances are correlated between the two questions. The system of equations is presented in utility difference form as:
(2) ΔV 1i = x 1i 'γ 1 + αC i = ε 1i where y 1i = 1 if ΔV 1i ≤ ε 1i , y 1i = 0, otherwise, where Φ a is the bivariate normal probability density function and Φ is the normal farm i's true WTA is greater than the bid offer,
, and C is the incentive payment offer. Using the same f equation (3) is the sample selection equation. Ass m for ε 1i and ε 2i , bivariate probit is used to estimate the two sets of coefficients. The bivariate probit with sample selection log-likelihood function for the situation where y 1i is observed only when y i2 = 0 is:
where C is included in X 1 for notational simplicity, Φ is the normal CDF, Φ a is the bivariate CDF, and ρ 12 is the correlation likelihood function in equation (4) between (2) and (3) and therefore corrects for the sample selection bias that could occ (2) were to be estimated singly (Boyes, Hoffman, and Low) . The disadvantages of the bivariate log-likelihood function in equation (4) are that convergence of the estimates is not always easily achieved and estimated covariance matrices are frequently singular. Note that if estimated ρ 12 = 0, then the farmers who answer the WTA question can be assumed to be randomly drawn from the sample and equation (3) can be ignored. Equation (2) can then be estimated using probit.
Applying the definition of conditional probability, the farmer response function for the bivariate probit case is as follows: inary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (6) on farmers ion, the sample for equation (6) is not drawn randomly from the population who answered the probability density function. P whether or not the farmer believes the practice will affect farm profitability, soil type, type of crop (s) As stated earlier, estimating the probit or bivariate probit with the sample s model is the first step of our research agenda. In addition to developing the farmer participation equation as a function of the offer amount, we would also like to know how many acres the farmer will enroll given, the decision to participate. 3 The number of acres enrolled in the preferred practice by farmer i can be stated as In addition to being potentially biased, OLS estimation of equation (6) is inefficient (Greene, 1990) . Equation (6) can be corrected by considering the responses to the qualitative dependent variable questions in the analysis of equation (6).
In this paper, an extension of the Heckman procedure to three equations is used for estimation (Tunali; Greene, 1992) when ρ is statistically different from zero. Since PACRES i is observed only when y 1i = 1 and y 2i = 0, the revised version of equation (6) is:
Tunali shows that equation (7) reduces to: Because the survey sampled some regions at higher rates than others (e.g., noncropland areas were sampled at lower rates than cropland by sampling weights. Not accounting for this exogenous stratified sampling presents t ghts across the observations is the sample size (Greene, 1992) . Performing well as their willingness to adopt these practices if they do not currently use the practice gives greater weight to observations that have a lower probability of being selected and less weight to observations with a higher probability of being selected. For estimation, the weights are multiplied by the sample size and divided by the sum of the weights so that the sum of the wei weighted estimation without scaling the weight variable in this manner can result in low standard errors, and thus, very high t-statistics for the estimated coefficients (Greene, 1992) .
Data Description
The 1992 All of these practices are currently being supported by WQIP. For the willingness to adopt question for all of the practices, the bids offered are $2, $4, $7, $10, $15, and $20.
The bid ranges were chosen to cover what we perceived to be the likely range of WTA.
The bids were randomly assigned with equal probability to the surveys. 6 The specific With c significant at the 5% among the other variables was lower, as would be expected. For several practices, BPWORK was significant and had a negative sign, suggesting that the greater the amount of off-farm work the primary operator performs, the less likely the farmer is to adopt th practices. Some variables that were significant for current users of the practices were not significant for current non-users, and vice versa.
Incorporating the information from the regression results presented in tables 3 and 4, table 5 presents the final, continuous stage of the selectivity model with sa selection regression results. Using the coefficient results from tables 3 and 4, th λ 1 and λ 2 variables were calculated as defined in equation (9) in the Gauss programm language. Then, for farmers who do not currently use the practices but say they will at the posted offer amounts, PACRES was regressed on λ 1 , λ 2 , and the rest of the explanat variables. As table 5 shows, the coefficients on λ 1 and λ 2 are significant for all the applicable practices. Generally, the R 2 's are quite good for cross-sectional regressions.
The coefficient on the BIDVAL is significant and has a correct sign for four of the five when the impact of BIDVAL through λ 1 nd λ 2 f ror t,
mple selection approach appears to be preferable to the n the provided that they are given sufficient information on the practice. However, the figure BIDVAL on acres enrolled for SMTST is positive a is included. Among the other regressors, TACRE, BPWORK, and NETINC were significant to at least the 5% level for the all the continuous portions of the bivariate probit sample selection regressions.
Tables 6 and 7 present the tobit double hurdle results, with the former presenting the probit portion (see "Obs" in tables 3 and 4 for sample sizes) and the latter the continuous portion. Presented at the bottom of table 7 is the bias of the predicted value o the dependent variable with respect to the actual value, as well as the mean square er (MSE) of the predicted value. Noting that the equations in table 7 and in table 5 are nested, the MSE values can be compared between the two models. The results show tha except for LEGCR, the MSE for the continuous portion of the double hurdle model is lower than that for the bivariate probit sample selection model. However, for all double hurdle regressions, the bias is unacceptably high when compared to those from the bivariate model. 9 Hence, if the researcher's goal is to predict enrollment, the selectivity model with bivariate probit sa double hurdle approach.
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Model Applications
Applying the bivariate probit coefficients results to the conditional probability equation i equation (5), figure 1 presents graphs of the relationship between the offer amount and probability of acceptance for those farmers who do not currently use the practices. The positive adoption rates ranging from 12-20% at $0 suggests that some current non-users may be willing to adopt the practice without an incentive payment (as do current users), ctices rent 0 incentive payment for farmers in the survey range from a w of 7.9% for MANTST to a high of 45% for SPLTN. 11 ws, the payments needed to encourage 50% of current non-users to as a function of the payment ffer.
ive payments are also estimated.
hese results can be used in a cost-benefit analysis to best decide how to allocate the program budget among the preferred production practices. also shows that only around an additional 10 % of current nonusers will adopt the pra if they are offered the current WQIP payments of around $10/acre. Hence, it is expensive to get current nonadopters of the practices described earlier to adopt the practice. Cur use rates of the practices at $ lo As figure 1 sho adopt are much higher than the current payments levels. Increasing payments to promote 100% adoption by current non-users would be costly. Given this, a cost-efficiency or cost-benefit analysis could be used to determine what participation rates, and hence, what offer amounts would be desirable for each practice.
Conclusion
Farmers can be encouraged to voluntarily adopt environmentally sound management practices through the use of incentive payments. Current USDA practice is to offer a fixed "take it or leave it" payment per acre to those not currently using the desired practices. Hence, there is insufficient observed data to model the probability of farmer 2. Hanemann (1984; 1989) provides formulas for estimating mean WTA.
3. As any government program would reserve the right (as the WQIP program does) to admit only the acreage it deems most critical for controlling water quality, the modeling of this supply response function does not imply that the farmer will be able to enroll all the acreage he desires into the program. However, the acreage supply response functions are important to the agency by giving some indication of the upper bound on the total cash payments the agency would have to make at each incentive level.
4. For estimation, it was found that convergence of the bivariate model was more easily achieved if the selection equation (equation 3) was set up such that y 2i is reversed, i.e. such that y 2i = 0 if the farmer current uses the practice and y 2i = 1, otherwise. In this case, the bivariate probit CDF is Φ a (-x 1 'β 1 ,-x 2 'β 2 ,ρ 12 ) and ∂λ 1i /∂Bid > 0 and ∂λ 2i /∂Bid < 0. 10. In this paper, we used sample selection approaches to select out the n practices for the purpose of estimating minimum WTA. However, even though we did not ask current users of the practice a valuation question, we know that they are willing to accept a $0 incentive payment per acre to use the practice. Hence, as an anonymous reviewer noted, if users and non-users have the same preference structure, then they can be combined together in the qualitative variable regression for determining minimum WTA thereby adding more information to the model than if only hypothe for their minimum WTA. We tried this approach with a multiple bound model along the lines of than in Hanemann, Loomis, and Kanninen. The qualitative dependent variable model results showed that for all cases except for LEGCR, the coefficients on BIDVAL are larger for the pooled data results than those from the probit adoption regressions wi current users excluded (table 3) . Additional information on the methods used and th e 3 Observations"/" Table 4 Observations." 11. These rates are 1 minus " Tabl   Table 1 
